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ABSTRACT 
We report a remarkable universality in the patterns of violence arising in three high-
profile ongoing wars, and in global terrorism. Our results suggest that these quite 
different conflict arenas currently feature a common type of enemy, i.e. the various 
insurgent forces are beginning to operate in a similar way regardless of their 
underlying ideologies, motivations and the terrain in which they operate. We provide 
a microscopic theory to explain our main observations. This theory treats the 
insurgent force as a generic, self-organizing system which is dynamically evolving 
through the continual coalescence and fragmentation of its constituent groups.  
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 The recent terrorist attacks in London, Madrid and New York (i.e. ‘9/11’), killed 
many people in a very short space of time. At the other extreme, the world currently hosts 
several longer-term ‘local’ conflicts within specific countries, in which there is a steady 
stream of new casualties every day. Examples include the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the longer-term guerrilla war in Colombia which is taking place against a back-drop of 
drug-trafficking and Mafia activity. The origins, motivations, locations and durations of 
these various conflicts are very different -- hence one would expect the details of their 
respective dynamical evolution to also be very different.  
Here we report the remarkable finding that identical patterns of violence are currently 
emerging within these different international arenas. Not only have the wars in Iraq and 
Colombia evolved to yield the same power-law behavior, but this behavior is currently of 
the same quantitative form as the war in Afghanistan and global terrorism in non-G7 
countries. Our findings suggest that the dynamical evolution of these various examples of 
modern conflict has less to do with geography, ideology, ethnicity or religion and much 
more to do with the day-to-day mechanics of human insurgency; the respective insurgent 
forces are effectively becoming identical in terms of how they operate. Our findings are 
backed up by extensive statistical tests on carefully prepared datasets, as discussed in the 
Supporting Online Material. We also provide a microscopic mathematical model which 
describes how such a ‘common enemy’ might be operating. The model represents the 
insurgent force as an evolving population of attack units whose destructive potential varies 
over time. Not only is the model’s power-law behavior in excellent agreement with the data 
from Iraq, Colombia and non-G7 terrorism, it is also consistent with data obtained from the 
recent war in Afghanistan. These findings suggest that modern insurgent wars tend to be 
driven by the same underlying mechanism: the continual coalescence and fragmentation of 
attack units. 
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Power-law distributions are known to arise in a large number of physical, biological, 
economic and social systems1. In the present context, a power-law distribution means that 
the probability that an event will occur with x  victims is given by p x( )= Cx−α  over a 
reasonably wide range of x , with C  and α  positive coefficients. This in turn implies that a 
graph of   vs.  will be a straight line with a negative slope of 
magnitude 
( )[ ]xXP ≥log ( )xlog
1−α .i Previous studies have shown that the distribution obtained from ‘old’ 
wars, 1816-1980, exhibits a power-law with α =1.80 9( )1-4.ii  However each data-point in 
these studies represents the total casualty figure for one particular war.  By contrast, our 
analysis looks at the pattern of casualties arising within a given war. Casualty numbers in 
global terrorist events, from 1968 to the present, are also known to obey power laws where 
in this case each data point is a terrorist attack5: α = 2.5 1( ) for non-G7 countries while 
α =1.71 3( ) for G7 countries5. We find that both Iraq and Colombia exhibit power-law 
behavior and that their power-law coefficients are currently close to 2.5, which is exactly 
the value characterizing non-G7 terrorism.  We also find power-law behavior for 
Afghanistan with a coefficient near 2.5. 
Figure 1 shows log-log plots of the fraction of all recorded events with x  or more 
victims, , versus ( xXP ≥ ) x . As a result of extensive statistical testing, as discussed in the 
Supporting Online Material, we conclude that this time-aggregated data from each war 
follows a power-law over a wide range of x  values.  
                                                 
)i We will refer to  as the cumulative distribution obtained from( xXP ≥ ( )xp . 
ii Numbers in parentheses give the standard error on the trailing figure in each case. 
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Figure 1 Log-log plots of the cumulative distributions  describing the total 
number of events with severity greater than 
)( xXP ≥
x , for the ongoing wars in Iraq (blue) 
and Colombia (green).  For Iraq, the severity is the lower estimate of deaths from 
the CERAC Integrated Iraq Dataset covering the period 5/1/03 to 10/23/05.  For 
Colombia, the severity is the total number of deaths plus injuries from the CERAC 
Colombia Conflict Dataset6 for 1988 through 2004.  Each line indicates the most 
likely power-law fit for the data above  (see Supporting Online Material). The 
estimated values turn out to be the same for both conflicts.  
minx
minx
 
As well as observing power-law behavior for the time-aggregated data shown in 
Figure 1, we also find power-law behavior over smaller time-windows. We can follow the 
time-evolution of the power-law coefficient α  by sliding this time-window through the 
data-series. Figure 2 shows the resulting α  values as a function of time, in addition to the 
corresponding 95% confidence bands.  Remarkably, these alpha values have recently 
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become very close to 2.5 which also happens to be the value for global terrorism in non-G7 
countries and the war in Afghanistan (see below). The implication is that these wars and 
global non-G7 terrorism are showing very similar underlying behavior.  
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Figure 2 The variation through time of the power-law coefficient α  for Iraq and 
Colombia, shown respectively as blue and green lines with square symbols 
together with their corresponding 95% confidence bands.  For Iraq and Colombia 
the time-windows are 400 and 800 days respectively, with each time-window 
sliding forward one month at a time.  The straight lines are fits through these 
points, and suggest a current value of α ≈ 2.5 for both wars. The values for G7 and 
non-G7 terrorism are also shown5.  
 
But why should a seemingly universal value of 2.5 emerge for Iraq, Colombia and 
non-G7 global terrorism? Standard physical mechanisms for generating power laws make 
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little sense in the context of Colombia or Iraq1.  One might initially guess that casualties 
would arise in rough proportion to the population sizes of the places where insurgent 
groups attack: given that city populations may follow a power law1, it is conceivable that 
this would also produce power laws for the severity of attacks.  However, we have tested 
this hypothesis against our Colombia data and it is resoundingly rejected.   
Figure 3 shows a model of modern ‘generic’ insurgent warfare which we have 
developed. Full details are given in the Supporting Online Material. Our model proposes 
that the insurgent force operates as a dynamically evolving population of fairly self-
contained units, which we call 'attack units'. Each attack unit has a particular 'attack 
strength' characterizing the number of casualties which typically arise in an event involving 
this attack unit. As time evolves, these attack units either join forces with other attack units 
(i.e. coalescence) or break up (i.e. fragmentation). Eventually this on-going process of 
coalescence and fragmentation reaches a dynamical steady-state which is solvable 
analytically, yielding a power-law with coefficient 5.2=α  (see Supporting Online 
Material). The combination of these empirical and analytical findings suggests that similar 
distributions of attack units are emerging in Colombia, Iraq and in non-G7 global terrorism, 
with each attack unit in an ongoing state of coalescence and fragmentation. Furthermore, 
our model offers the following interpretation for the evolution of α  observed in Figure 2: 
The Iraq war began as a conventional confrontation between large armies, but continuous 
pressure applied to the Iraqis by coalition forces has fragmented the insurgency into a 
structure in which smaller attack units, characteristic of non-G7 global terrorism, now 
predominate.  In Colombia, on the other hand, the guerrillas in the early 1990’s had even 
less ability than global terrorists to coalesce into high-impact units but have gradually been 
acquiring comparable capabilities.  
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Figure 3   Our analytically-solvable model describing modern insurgent warfare. The 
insurgent force comprises attack units, each of which has a particular attack strength. As 
indicated by the dark shadows, this attack strength represents the number of casualties 
which the attack unit would typically inflict in a conflict event. The total attack strength is 
being continually re-distributed through coalescence and fragmentation of the attack units. 
 
 
These empirical and analytical findings lead us to speculate that power-law patterns 
will emerge within any modern asymmetric war which is being fought by loosely-organized 
insurgent groups. Such generic behavior can be explained using theoretical models which 
describe group formation, rather than having to invoke case-specific issues such as politics 
or geography. Although future wars will provide the ultimate test of such a claim, Figure 4 
provides some further supporting evidence. In particular, the casualty figures from the 
recent Afghanistan war follow a power-law with α  very close to 2.5. Additional supporting 
cases will be presented elsewhere.  
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Finally, we note that we have obtained access to preliminary databases from a range 
of other insurgent-like wars in recent history. Since we have not been able to subject their 
event entries to the same rigorous scrutiny as those for Iraq, Colombia and Afghanistan, 
any estimates of power-laws from them would be subject to very large error-bars. However, 
it is interesting to note that if we carry out the same exercise as in this paper, and treat the 
resulting estimates at face value, then the average value of α  obtained across a broad 
platform of such wars –including Casamance (Senegal), Indonesia, Israel and Northern 
Ireland – is between 2.4 and 2.5. A detailed discussion of these other conflicts will be given 
elsewhere after we have been able to cross-check the accuracy of the respective databases.  
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Figure 4 Log-log plots of the cumulative distribution  describing the total 
number of events with killings greater than 
)( xXP ≥
x  for Afghanistan. The data is the lower 
estimate from the CERAC Integrated Afghanistan Dataset, covering the period 
9/9/01 to 7/31/04.  The power-law fit, together with the estimated α  and , are 
shown. 
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Supporting Online Material 
PART 1:    Details of the model mentioned in the paper 
Here we provide details of our model of modern insurgent warfare, which we 
introduced in the main paper. Our goal is to provide a plausible model to explain (i) why 
power-law behavior is observed in the Colombia, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and in non-
G7 global terrorism, and (ii) why the power-law coefficients for the Colombia and Iraq 
wars should both be currently around the value of 2.5, observed in non-G7 terrorism and 
Afghanistan.  
Our model bears some similarity to a model of herding by Cont and Bouchaudiii, and 
is a direct adaptation of the Eguiluz-Zimmerman model of herding in financial marketsiv. 
The analytical derivation which we present, is an adaptation of earlier formalism laid out by 
D’Hulst and Rodgersv, and also draws heavily on the material in the book Financial Market 
Complexity by Neil F. Johnson, Paul Jefferies and Pak Ming Hui (Oxford University Press, 
2003). One of us (NFJ) is extremely grateful to Pak Ming Hui for detailed correspondence 
about the Eguiluz-Zimmerman model of financial markets, the associated formalism, and 
its extensions – and also for discussions involving the present model.  
As suggested by Figure 3 in the paper, our model is based on the plausible notion that 
the total attack capability of a modern insurgent force is being continually re-distributed. 
                                                 
 
iv R. Cont and J.P. Bouchaud, Macroeconomic Dynamics 4, 170 (2000) 
iv V.M. Eguiluz and M.G. Zimmerman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5659 (2000) 
v R. D’Hulst and G.J. Rodgers, Eur. Phys. J. B 20, 619 (2001). See also Y. Xie, B.H. Wang, H. Quan, W. 
Yang and P.M. Hui, Phys. Rev. E 65, 046130 (2002). 
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Based on our intuition about such ‘new’ wars, we consider the insurgent force to be made 
up of attack units, with each one having a certain attack strength (see below for a detailed 
discussion). It is reasonable to expect that the total attack strength for the entire insurgent 
force would change fairly slowly over time.  At any particular instant, this total attack 
strength is distributed (i.e. partitioned) among the various attack units -- moreover the 
composition of these attack units, and hence their relative attack strengths, will evolve in 
time as a result of an on-going process of coalescence (i.e. combination of attack units) and 
fragmentation (i.e. breaking up of attack units). Such a process of coalescence and 
fragmentation is realistic for an insurgent force in a guerilla-like war, and will be driven by 
a combination of planned decisions and opportunistic actions by both the insurgent force 
and the incumbent force. For example, separate attack units might coalesce prior to an 
attack, or an individual attack unit might fragment in response to a crackdown by the 
incumbent force. Here we will model this process of coalescence and fragmentation as a 
stochastic process.  
Each attack unit carries a specific label  and has an attack strength denoted 
by  respectively. By attack unit we have in mind a group of people, weapons, 
explosives, machines, or even information, which organizes itself to act as a single unit. In 
the case of people, this means that they are probably connected by location (e.g. they are 
physically together) or connected by some communication system. In the case of a piece of 
equipment, this means that it is readily available for use by members of a particular group. 
The simplest scenario is to just consider people, and in particular a group of insurgents 
which are in such frequent contact that they are able to act as a single group. However, we 
emphasize that an attack unit may also consist of a combination of people and objects – for 
example, explosives plus a few people, such as in the case of suicide bombers. Such an 
attack unit, while only containing a few people, could have a high attack strength. In 
K,,, kji
K,,, kji sss
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addition, information could also be a valuable part of an attack unit. For example, a lone 
suicide bomber who knows when a certain place will be densely populated (e.g. a military 
canteen at lunchtimes) and who knows how to get into such a place unnoticed, will also 
represent an attack unit with a high attack strength.  We define the attack strength, , of a 
given attack unit i , as the average number of people who are typically injured or killed as 
the result of an event involving attack unit i . In other words, a typical event (e.g. attack or 
clash) involving group  will lead to the injury or death of  people. This definition covers 
both the case of one-sided attacks by attack unit i  (since in this case, all casualties are due 
to the presence of attack unit i) and it also covers two-sided clashes (since presumably there 
would have been no clash, and hence no casualties, if unit i  had not been present). 
si
i si
We take the sum of the attack strengths over all the attack units (i.e. the total attack 
strength of the insurgent force) to be equal to N . From the definition of attack strength, it 
follows that N  represents the maximum number of people which would be injured or killed 
in an event, on average, if the entire insurgent force were to act together as a single attack 
unit. Mathematically, . For any significant insurgent force, one would 
expect
  
si
i, j ,k,K
∑ N=
N >> 1, however the power-law results that we will derive do not depend on any 
particular choice of N . In particular, the power-law result derived in this section concerning 
the average number ns of attack units having a given attack strength , is invariant under a 
global magnification of scale (as are all power-laws).  
s
Hence our model becomes, in mathematical terms, one in which the total attack 
strength N  is being continually re-distributed among attack groups as a result of an 
ongoing process of coalescence and fragmentation. As a further clarification of our 
terminology, we will now discuss the two limiting cases which, for convenience, we 
classify as the ‘complete coalescence’ and ‘complete fragmentation’ limits: 
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• ‘Complete coalescence’ limit: Suppose the conflict is such that all the attack 
units join together or coalesce into a single large attack unit. This would 
correspond to amassing all the available combatants and weaponry in a single 
place – very much like the armies of the past would amass their entire force 
on the field of battle. Hence there is one large attack unit, which we label as  
and which has an attack strength
i
N . All other attack units disappear. 
Hence si → N . This complete coalescence limit has the minimum possible 
number of attack units (i.e. one) but the maximum possible attack strength (i.e. 
N ) in that attack unit. 
• ‘Complete fragmentation’ limit: Suppose the conflict is such that all the attack 
units fragment into ever smaller attack units. Eventually all attack units will 
have attack strength equal to one. Hence  for allsi →1 Ni ,,2,1 K= . This 
would correspond to all combatants operating essentially individually. This 
complete fragmentation limit has the maximum possible number of attack 
units (i.e. N ) but the minimum possible attack strength per attack unit (i.e. 
one). 
 In practice, of course, one would expect the situation to lie between these two limits 
of complete coalescence and complete fragmentation. In particular, it seems reasonable to 
expect that the attack units and their respective attack strengths will evolve in time within a 
given war. Indeed, one can envisage that the attack units will occasionally either break up 
into smaller groups (i.e. smaller attack units) or join together to form larger ones. The 
reasons are plentiful why this should occur: for example, the opposing forces (e.g. the 
Colombian Armed Forces and National Police in Colombia or Coalition Forces in Iraq or 
Afghanistan) may be applying pressure in terms of searching for hidden insurgent groups. 
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Hence these insurgent groups (i.e. attack units) might either decide, or be forced, to break 
up in order to move more quickly, or in order to lose themselves in the towns or 
countryside.  
Hence attack units with different attack strengths will continually mutate via 
coalescence and fragmentation yielding a ‘soup’ of attack units with a range of attack 
strengths. At any one moment in time, this ‘soup’ corresponds mathematically to 
partitioning the total N  units of attack strength which the insurgent army possesses. The 
analysis which we now present suggests that the current states of the guerilla/insurgency 
wars in Colombia, Iraq and Afghanistan all correspond to the steady-state limit of such an 
on-going coalescence-fragmentation process. It also suggests that such a process might also 
underpin the acts of terrorism in non-G7 countries, and that such terrorism is characteristic 
of some longer-term ‘global war’.  
Against the backdrop of on-going fragmentation and coalescence of attack units, we 
suppose that each attack unit has a given probability  of being involved in an event in a 
given time-interval, regardless of its attack strength. For example, p could represent the 
probability that an arbitrarily chosen attack unit comes across an undefended target – or 
vice versa, the probability that an arbitrarily chosen attack unit finds itself under attack. In 
these instances, p should be relatively insensitive to the actual attack strength of the attack 
unit involved: given this condition, the results which we shall derive for the distribution of 
attack strengths can also be used to describe the distribution of events having a given 
severity. When obtaining our results, we shall assume that the war has been underway for a 
long time and hence some kind of steady-state has been reached. This latter assumption is 
plausible for the conflicts in Colombia, Iraq and Afghanistan, and also for non-G7 
terrorism. Given these considerations, it follows that if there are on average 
p
ns attack units 
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of a given attack strength , then the number of events involving an attack unit of attack 
strength  will be proportional to
s
s ns. We assume, quite realistically, that only one insurgent 
attack group participates in a given event. For example, attacks in which 10 people are 
killed are due to an attack by a unit of attack strength 10 as opposed to simultaneous attacks 
by a unit of strength 6 and a unit of strength 4 (i.e. 6+4=10). Hence the number of events in 
which  people were killed and/or injured, is just proportional tos ns. In other words, the 
histogram, and hence power-law, that we will derive for the dependence of ns on , will 
also describe the number of events with  casualties versus . Indeed, if we consider that an 
event will typically have duration of T, and that there will only be a few such events in a 
given interval T, then these results should also appear similar to the distribution describing 
the number of intervals of duration T in which there were  casualties, versus . This is 
indeed what we have found in our analysis of the empirical data.  
s
s s
s s
Given the above discussion, our task of analyzing and deducing the average number 
of events with  casualties versus  over a given period of time becomes equivalent to the 
task of analyzing and deducing the average number n
s s
s of attack units of a given attack 
strength  in that same period of time. This is what we will now calculate. We will start by 
considering a reasonable mechanism for the coalescence and fragmentation of attack 
groups, before then finally deducing analytically the corresponding power-law behavior 
and obtaining a power-law coefficient equal to 2.5. 
s
t
i
Consider an arbitrary attack unit  with attack strength . At any one instant in time, 
labeled , we assume that this attack unit will do any one of three things: 
i si
a) fragment (i.e. break up) into  attack units of attack strength equal to 1. This 
feature aims to mimic an insurgent group which decides, either voluntarily or 
s
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involuntarily, to split itself up (e.g. in order to reduce the chance of being 
captured and/or to mislead the enemy).  
b) coalesce (i.e. combine) with another attack unit j  of attack strength , hence 
forming a single attack unit of attack strength 
s j
si + s j . This feature mimics two 
insurgent groups finding each other by chance (e.g. in the Colombian jungle) 
or deciding via radio communication to meet up and join forces.  
c) remain unchanged. This feature mimics an insurgent group which has no 
reason to split itself up, nor does it have a reason to coalesce with another 
attack unit. 
To implement this process for each possible attack unit and at every timestep, we proceed 
as follows.  At each timestep, we choose an attack unit  at random but with a probability 
which is proportional to its attack strength . With a probability
i
si ν , this attack unit i  with 
attack strength   fragments into  attack units with attack strength 1. A justification for 
choosing attack unit  with a probability which is proportional to its attack strength is as 
follows: attack units with higher attack strength are likely to be bigger and hence will either 
run across the enemy more and/or be more actively sought by the enemy. By contrast, with 
a probability 
si si
i
1−ν( ) , the chosen attack unit  instead coalesces with another attack unit  
which is chosen at random, but again with a probability which is proportional to its attack 
strength . The two attack units of attack strengths  and s  then combine to form a bigger 
attack unit of attack strength . The justification for choosing attack unit 
i j
s j si j
si + s j j  for 
coalescence with a probability which is proportional to its attack strength is as follows: it is 
presumably risky to combine attack units, since it must involve at least one message 
passing between the two units in order to coordinate their actions. Hence it becomes 
increasingly less worthwhile to combine attack units as the attack units get smaller.  
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This model is thus characterized by a single parameterν . The connectivity among the 
attack units is driven by the dynamics of the model. For very small ν  (i.e. much less than 
1), the attack units steadily coalesce. This leads to the formation of large attack units. In the 
other limit of ν → 1, the system consists of many attack units with attack strength close to 
1. A value of ν = 0.01 corresponds to about one fragmentation in every 100 iterations. In 
what follows, we assume that ν  is small since the process of fragmentation should not be 
very frequent for any insurgent force which is managing to sustain an ongoing war. Indeed 
if such fragmentation were very frequent, then this would imply that the insurgents were 
being so pressured by the incumbent force that they had to fragment at nearly every 
timestep. Hence that particular war should not last very long. It turns out that infrequent 
fragmentations are sufficient to yield a steady-state process, and will also yield the power-
law behavior which we observe for Colombia and Iraq.  
A typical result obtained from numerical simulations of this model, for the 
distribution of ns versus attack strength  in the long-time limit (i.e. steady-state), is shown 
below in terms of 
s
ns n1 :  
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 Figure S1:  Log-log plot of the number of attack units with attack strength s, versus 
attack strength s. Here N =10,000 andν = 0.01. The results are obtained from a 
numerical simulation of the model. The initial conditions of this numerical 
simulation are such that all attack units have size 1 -- however, changing this initial 
condition does not change the main results which emerge in the steady state. As 
time evolves, the attack units undergo coalescence and fragmentation as 
described in the text. In the long-time limit, the system reaches a steady-state with 
power-law dependence as shown in the figure and with an associated power-law 
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coefficient of 2.5 (i.e. 5/2). The deviation from power-law behavior at large s is 
simply due to the finite value of N: since there can be no attack unit with attack 
strength greater than N, the finite size of N distorts the power-law as s approaches 
N. 
 
We now provide an analytic derivation of the observed power-law behavior, and 
specifically the power-law coefficient 2.5, in the steady-state (i.e. long-time) limit. 
One can write a dynamical equation for the evolution of the model at different levels 
of approximation. For example, one could start with a microscopic description of the 
system by noting that at any moment in time, the entire insurgent army can be described by 
a partition    of the total attack strength l1,l2,K,lN{ } N  into N  attack units. Here ls is the 
number of attack units of attack strength . For example s  0,0,K,1{ } corresponds to the 
'complete coalescence' limit discussed earlier, in which all the attack strength is 
concentrated in one big attack unit. By contrast,  N,0,K,0{ } corresponds to the 'complete 
fragmentation' limit in which all the attack units have attack strength of 1 (i.e. there are N  
attack units of attack strength 1). Clearly, the total amount of attack strength is 
conserved .  All that happens is that the way in which this total attack strength N 
is partitioned will change in time.  
ili
i=1
N∑  =  N
In principle, the dynamics could be described by the time-evolution of the probability 
function  : in particular, taking the continuous-time limit would yield an 
equation for   
p l1,l2,K,lN[ ]
]dp l1,l2,K,lN[ dt  in terms of transitions between partitions. For example, the 
fragmentation of an attack unit of attack strength  leads to a transition from the partition 
 to the partition  
s
  l1,K,ls,K,lN{ } l1 + s,K,ls −1,K,lN{ }. For our purposes, however, it is more 
convenient to work with the average number ns  of attack units of attack strength , which s
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can be written as . The sum is over all possible partitions. 
Since    evolves in time, so does
  
ns =  p
l1,...,lN{ }
∑ [l1,...,ls,K,lN ] ⋅ ls
p l1,K,lN[ ] ns t[ ]. After the transients have died away, the 
system is expected to reach a steady-state in which  p l1,K,lN[ ] and ns t[ ] become time-
independent. The time-evolution of ns t[ ] can be written down either by intuition, or by 
invoking a mean-field approximation to the equation for  dp l1,l2,K,lN[ ] dt . Taking the 
intuitive route, one can immediately write down the following dynamical equations in the 
continuous-time limit: 
∂ns
∂t = −
ν sns
N
+ 1− ν( )
N 2
s'ns' s − s'( )ns− s' − 2 1−ν( )snsN 2 s'ns's'=1
∞∑
s'=1
s−1∑       for s ≥ 2         (0.1) 
 ∂n1∂t =
ν
N s'( )
2 ns'
s'=2
∞∑ − 2 1− ν( )n1N 2 s'ns's'=1
∞∑   (0.2) 
The terms on the right-hand side of Equation (0.1) represent all the ways in which ns can 
change. The first term represents a decrease in ns  due to the fragmentation of an attack unit 
of attack strength : this happens only if an attack unit of attack strength  is chosen and if 
fragmentation then follows. The former occurs with probability 
s s
sns N  (see earlier 
discussion) and the latter with probabilityν . The second term represents an increase in ns  
as a result of the merging of an attack unit of attack strength s'  with an attack unit of attack 
strength . The third term describes the decrease in s − s'( ) ns  due to the merging of an attack 
unit of attack strength  with any other attack unit. For the s s =1 case described by Equation 
(0.2), the chosen attack unit remains isolated; thus Equation (0.2) does not have a 
contribution like the first term of Equation (0.1). The first term which appears in Equation 
(0.2) reflects the increase in the number of attack units of attack strength equal to 1, due to 
fragmentation of an attack unit. Similarly to Equation (0.1), the last term of Equation (0.2) 
describes the merging of an attack unit with attack strength 1, with an attack unit of any 
other attack strength. Equations (0.1) and (0.2) are so-called ‘master equations’ describing 
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the dynamics within the model. Note that for simplicity, we are only considering 
fragmentation into attack units of attack strength 1. However this could be generalized – 
indeed, we will look at more general fragmentations in future publications. 
In the long-time steady state limit, Equations (0.1) and (0.2) yield:  
 sns = 1− ν( )2 − ν( )N s'ns' s− s'( )ns− s's'=1
s−1∑      for s ≥ 2 (0.3) 
 n1 = ν2 1−ν( ) ′ s ( )
2 n ′ s 
′ s = 2
∞∑  (0.4) 
Equations of this type are most conveniently treated using the general technique of 
‘generating functions’. As the name suggests, these are functions which can be used to 
generate a range of useful quantities. Consider 
  (0.5) G y[ ]= s' ns' y s'
s'= 0
∞∑
where y = e−ω  is a parameter. Note that sns N  is the probability of finding an attack unit 
of attack strength . If G y  is known, s [ ] sns is then formally given by  
 sns = 1s!G
(s) 0[ ] (0.6) 
where G(s) y[ ] is the -th derivative of G ys [ ]with respect to . Gy (s) y[ ] can be decomposed 
as  
  (0.7) G y[ ]= n1 y + s'ns'
s'= 2
∞∑ y s' ≡ n1 y + g y[ ]
where the function  governs the attack-units’ attack-strength distribution g y[ ] ns  for . 
The next task is to obtain an equation for
s ≥ 2
g y[ ]. This can be done in two ways. One could 
either write down the terms in  explicitly and then make use of Equation (0.3), or g y[ ]( )2
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one could construct  by multiplying Equation (0.3) by eg y[ ] −ωs  and then summing over s. 
The resulting equation is: 
 g y[ ]( )2 − 2 −ν
1−ν N − 2n1 y
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ g y[ ]+ n12 y 2 = 0  (0.8) 
First we solve for . From Equation (0.7), n1 g 1[ ]= G 1[ ]− n1 = N − n1. Substituting 
 into Equation (0.8) and settingn = N − g 1[ ]1 y =1, yields  
 g 1[ ]= 1− ν
2 − ν N  (0.9) 
Hence      n1 = N − g 1[ ]= 12 − ν N          (0.10) 
To obtain ns  with , we need to solve fors ≥ 2 g y[ ]. Substituting Equation (0.10) for , 
Equation (0.8) becomes  
n1
 g y[ ]( )2 − 2 −ν
1−ν N −
2N
2 − ν y
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ g y[ ]+ N
2
2 −ν( )2 y
2 = 0  (0.11) 
Equation (0.11) is a quadratic equation for g y[ ] which can be solved to obtain 
 
g y[ ]= 2 − ν( )N
4 1−ν( ) 1− 1−
4 1− ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
2
= 2 − ν( )N
4 1−ν( ) 2 −
4 1−ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y − 2 1−
4 1− ν( )
2 − ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ .
 (0.12) 
Using the expansionvi  
 1− x( )1 2 =1− 1
2
x − (2k − 3)!!
(2k)!!k = 2
∞∑ x k,  (0.13) 
                                                 
vi The ‘double factorial’ operator !! denotes the product: ( )( )!! 2 4n n n n= − − K  
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we have  
 g y[ ]= 2 − ν( )N
2 1− ν( )
2k − 3( )!!
2k( )!!k =2
∞∑ 4 1−ν( )2 −ν( )2 y
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
k
. (0.14) 
Comparing the coefficients in Equation (0.14) with the definition of g y[ ] in Equation (0.7), 
the probability of finding an attack unit of attack strength s is given by: 
 
sns
N
= 2 − ν( )
2 1− ν( )
2s − 3( )!!
2s( )!!
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
. (0.15) 
It hence follows that the average number of attack units of attack strength  is  s
 
ns = 2 − ν( )2 1− ν( )
2s − 3( )!!
s 2s( )!!
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
N
= 1− ν( )
s−1 2s − 2( )!
2 − ν( )2s−1 s!( )2 N
 (0.16) 
The -dependence of s ns  is implicit in Equation (0.16), with the dominant dependence 
arising from the factorials. Recall Stirling’s series for ln s![ ]: 
 
  
ln s![ ]= 1
2
ln 2π[ ]+ s + 1
2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ ln s[ ]− s + 112s −L . (0.17) 
Retaining the few terms shown in Equation (0.17) is in fact a very good approximation, 
giving an error of <  for . This motivates us to take the logarithm of both sides 
of Equation (0.16) and then apply Stirling’s formula to each log-factorial term, as in 
Equation (0.17). We follow these mathematical steps (which were derived in the M.Phil. 
thesis of Larry Yip, Chinese University of Hong Kong, who was supervised by Prof. Pak 
Ming Hui). We hence obtain 
0.05% s ≥ 2
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Combining the terms on the right-hand side into a single logarithm, it follows that  
 ns ≈ 2 −ν( )e
2
23/ 2 2π 1−ν( )
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
s
⋅ s −1( )
2s− 3 2
s2s+1
N . (0.18) 
The -dependence at large s can then be deduced from Equation (0.18): s
 ns ~ N
4 1−ν( )
2 −ν( )2
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ 
s
s−5 2 . (0.19) 
The above equation (0.19) can be re-written as follows: 
   ns ~ N exp −s ln 1−ν 2( )
2
1−ν( )
⎡ 
⎣ 
⎢ ⎢ 
⎤ 
⎦ 
⎥ ⎥ 
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ s−5 2 
which shows that at large s, there will be an exponential cut-off. This makes sense since the 
coalescence process for attack units with very large attack strength will always be 
hampered by the fact that the total insurgent attack strength N is itself finite -- indeed, such 
a cut-off at large s is also observed in the empirical war data. For sufficiently small values 
ofν , the dominant dependence on s over a wide range of intermediate s-values will be 
 ns ~ s
−5 2 hence ns ~ s
−2.5 (0.20) 
This analysis therefore shows analytically that the distribution of attack strengths should 
follow a power-law with exponent α = 2.5 (i.e. 5/2) over a fairly wide range of values of s. 
As discussed earlier, we assume that any particular attack unit could be involved in an 
event in a given time interval, with a probability p which is independent of its attack size. 
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Hence these power-law results which we have derived for the distribution of attack 
strengths, will also apply to the distribution of attacks of severity x. (Recall that the attack 
strength s is a measure of the number of casualties in a typical event, and that the severity x 
of an event is measured as the number of casualties). In other words, the same power-law 
exponent α = 2.5 derived in Equation (0.20), will also apply to the distribution of attacks 
having severity x.  
 Hence our model predicts that any guerrilla-like war which is characterized by 
an ongoing process of coalescence and fragmentation of attack units, and hence an 
ongoing re-distribution of the total attack strength, will have the following properties:  
(i) The distribution of events with severity x will follow a power-law. This finding is 
consistent with the behavior observed for the aggregated data in the Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Colombia wars (see Figure 1 of the paper). 
(ii) The power-law distribution will, in the steady-state (i.e. long-time) limit, have an 
exponentα = 2.5 . This is precisely the value which the on-going wars in Colombia and 
Iraq seem to have reached in recent months (see Figure 2 of the paper) and that 
Afghanistan exhibits for the whole sample period (see Figure 4 of the paper). 
 
We will now attempt to go one step further by providing a generalization of the above 
model in order to offer an explanation for the temporal evolution of the power-law 
coefficient α  which was observed in Figure 2. For technical reasons related to the 
mathematics of the generating-function approach which we employ, the analytic results 
which we will obtain for the power-law coefficient α  will be more approximate than in the 
earlier case. However, we have performed numerical simulations to check that these 
 27
analytic results are still in fact reliable -- furthermore, these analytic results will end up 
offering important insights into the temporal behavior of α  which is observed in Figure 2.  
Our generalized model is as follows. Exactly as before, at each timestep an attack unit 
is randomly picked to be a candidate for the fragmentation-coalescence process. Also as 
before, the probability of being picked is proportional to its attack strength. We retain this 
feature of having the probability of being picked as being proportional to the attack 
strength, since it makes sense to us -- for example, the larger an attack unit, the more likely 
it will be that it is discovered by opposing forces (and hence may need to decide whether to 
fragment) or that it itself comes across another attack unit and therefore may need to decide 
whether to coalesce. In short, it makes sense to us that, on a daily basis, the larger the attack 
unit is in terms of its attack strength then the more likely it is that it will become a 
candidate for fragmentation or coalescence. In other words, it seems reasonable to us that 
the larger the attack strength, the more likely it is that one of the attack unit's constituent 
parts will become faced with a situation which could lead to fragmentation or coalescence. 
We now move on to the details of the fragmentation-coalescence process, since this is 
where the generalization will occur. Suppose a particular attack unit  has been picked at a 
particular timestep, and that it has an attack strength . As before, it is then selected for 
fragmentation with a probability
i
si
ν , and for coalescence with a probability1− ν . However 
unlike the earlier version, it does not necessarily undergo either (hence our use of the word 
'selected'). Instead, the rules are as follows. Suppose it gets selected for fragmentation: it 
will now fragment with a probability f si[ ] which depends on . Suppose instead that it 
gets selected for coalescence: as before, a second attack unit  is then picked randomly 
with a probability which is proportional to its attack strength . However unlike the earlier 
version, these two attack units will now coalesce with a probability 
si
j
s j
f si[ ] f s j[ ] which 
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depends on  and s . Hence even if a given attack unit is selected for fragmentation or 
coalescence, neither process is now guaranteed to occur.  
si j
The upshot of this generalization is that there are now effectively three probabilistic 
processes at each timestep:  
(1) an initial random picking (biased according to attack strength) in order to select an 
attack unit as a candidate for the fragmentation-coalescence process;  
(2) a coin-toss (biased according to the value of ν ) in order to decide whether this 
particular attack unit is being selected for fragmentation or for coalescence. In terms of the 
mechanics of a war, ν  is the probability that this attack unit is confronted with a situation 
which might lead to fragmentation, while 1− ν  is the probability that this attack unit is 
confronted with a situation which might lead to coalescence;  
(3) another coin-toss (biased according to f si[ ] for fragmentation, and f si[ ]f sj[ ] for 
coalescence) to decide whether the attack unit actually goes through with the fragmentation 
or coalescence process for which it has been selected. Note that the basic version of the 
model, which we studied in detail above, corresponds to the simple case with  and 
 for all values of  and s .  
f si[ ]=1
f s j[ ]=1 si j
 In what follows, we demonstrate the specific case where f s[ ] ~ s−δ  over a 
reasonably wide range of s. In other words, over a reasonably wide range of s the 
probability function  decreases with increasing  if f s[ ] s δ  is positive, and increases with 
increasing  if s δ  is negative. We will also comment on the interpretation and consequences 
of such a probability function in the setting of the real-world conflicts that we are focusing 
on. 
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Since  is a probability, it must of course be normalized and hence cannot strictly 
take on the form 
f s[ ]
f s[ ] ~ s−δ  for all s and all δ  -- however this does not prevent it from 
following the functional form f s[ ] ~ s−δ  over a reasonably wide range of s. Analytically, 
the master equations for f s[ ] ~ s−δ  can then be readily written down: 
 ∂ns∂t = −
ν s1−δ ns
N
+ 1− ν( )
N 2
s'( )1−δ ns' (s− s')1−δ ns− s' − 2 1−ν( )s
1−δ ns
N 2
s'( )1−δ ns'
s'=1
∞∑
s'=1
s−1∑   for s ≥ 2  (0.21) 
 
∂n1
∂t =
ν
N
s'( )2−δ ns' − 2 1−ν( )n1N 2 s'( )
1−δ ns'
s'=1
∞∑
s'=2
∞∑   (0.22) 
with the meaning of each term being similar to that for Equations (0.1) and (0.2). The 
steady state equations become  
  (0.23) s1−δ ns = A s'( )1−δ ns' (s − s')1−δ ns−s'
s'=1
s−1∑
  (0.24) n1 = B s'( )2−δ
s'= 2
∞∑ ns'
The constant coefficients A and B are given by  
A = 1−ν
N ν + 2 1− ν( ) s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑      and     B =
N ν
2 1− ν( ) s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑  
Setting δ = 0 in Equations (0.23) and (0.24) recovers Equations (0.3) and (0.4) for the 
original model. A generating function  
  (0.25) G y[ ]= s'( )1−δ
s'= 0
∞∑ ns' ys' = n1 y + g y[ ]
can be introduced where g y[ ]= s'( )1−δ ns's'=2∞∑ y s' and y = e−ω . The function  satisfies a 
quadratic equation of the form  
g y[ ]
 g y[ ]( )2 − 1A − 2n1 y⎛ ⎝ ⎞ ⎠ g y[ ]+ n12 y 2 = 0  (0.26) 
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which is a generalization of Equation (0.8). Using n1 + g 1[ ]= s'( )1−δs'=1∞∑ ns'  and Equation 
(0.26), can be obtained as  n1
 n1 = 1−ν( )
2 − ν2 A2 N 2
4 1−ν( )2 A  (0.27) 
Solving Equation (0.26) for gives  g y[ ]
 g y[ ]= 1
4A 1− 1− 4n1 A y( )2  (0.28) 
Following the steps leading to Equation (0.19), we obtain ns in the modified model: 
4 1−ν( ) 1− ν( )+ N ν
s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ 
2
⎛ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ 
s
s−(5/2−δ ) (0.29)  
 
n  N~ 
For δ = 0, 
(0.19) for the origin
s'( )1
s'=1
∞∑
smallν , the domina
equivalently ns ~ s
−(
now has a highly no
reasonably accurate
We can there
the relative fragme
spectrum of power
initial value of 1.8,
decreasing δ  from
tendency for larger
 sN ν
s'( )1−δ ns's'=1∞∑ + 2 1−ν( )
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ 
 
 and hence Equation (0.29) reduces to the result in Equation 
al model. For
−δ ns' = N
δ ≠ 0, it is difficult to solve explicitly for ns . However for 
nt dependence on the attack strength s should be ns ~ s
− 5 2−δ( ) and hence 
2.5−δ )
s
.  Although this result is only approximate given that the prefactor 
n-trivial dependence on , numerical simulations show that it is 
.   
fore can see that by decreasing δ  from  (i.e. by increasing 
ntation/coalescence rates of larger attack units) we span the entire 
-law exponents observed in the Iraq war (see Figure 2) from the 
 up to the current value of approximately 2.5. This effect of 
0.7 → 0
 0.7  corresponds in our model to a relative increase in the 
 attack units to fragment at each timestep. In other words, 
→ 0
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decreasing δ  mimics the effect of decreasing the relative robustness or ‘lifetime’ of 
larger attack units. A somewhat similar argument applies to Colombia using negative 
values forδ: by increasing δ  from about −0.5 → 0  we span the spectrum of power-law 
exponents observed in the Colombia war (see Figure 2) from the initial value of near 
3, down to the current value of approximately 2.5. This effect of increasing δ  
corresponds in our model to a relative decrease in the tendency for larger attack units 
to fragment at each timestep. As suggested above, for technical reasons this argument 
is slightly less satisfactory than for the case of Iraq -- this is because  will now 
need to have a non-monotonic functional form since it must still normalize to 1 over 
all s. 
f s[ ]
 
Going further, we note that the above theoretical results are consistent with, and to 
some extent explain, the various power-law exponents found for: 
(1) Conventional wars. The corresponding power-law exponent 1.8 referred to in the paper 
for conventional wars, can now be interpreted through our generalized model (with δ ≈ 0.7) 
as a tendency toward building larger, robust attack units with a fixed attack strength as in a 
conventional army -- as opposed to attack units with rapidly fluctuating attack strengths as 
a result of frequent fragmentation and coalescence processes. There is also a tendency to 
form a distribution of attack units with a wider spectrum of attack strengths – this is again 
consistent with the composition of ‘conventional’ armies. 
(2) Terrorism in G7 countries. The corresponding power-law exponent 1.7 for G7 terrorism 
can now be interpreted through our generalized model (with ) as an even stronger δ ≈ 0.8
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tendency for robust units (e.g. terrorist cells) to form. There is also an increased tendency to 
form larger units – or equivalently, to operate as part of a large organization. 
(3) Terrorism in non-G7 countries. The corresponding power-law exponent 2.5 for non-G7 
terrorism can now be interpreted through our model (withδ = 0) as a tendency toward more 
transient attack units than for G7 terrorism, with attack strengths which are continually 
evolving dynamically as a result of an on-going fragmentation and coalescence process. 
Unlike a conventional army, there will be a tendency to form smaller attack units rather 
than larger ones. 
 
As suggested above, the evolution of the wars in Colombia and Iraq can also be discussed 
in such terms: 
War in Colombia. At the beginning of the 1990’s, the power-law exponent was very high. 
Then over the following 15 years, it gradually lowered and has hovered near 2.5 from 1999 
onwards. Using our model, the interpretation is that the war at the beginning of the 1990’s 
was such that the guerrillas favored having small attack units. This is possibly because they 
lacked communications infrastructure, and/or did not feel any safety in larger numbers. The 
decrease toward the value 2.5, suggests that this has changed – probably because of 
increased infrastructure and communications, enabling attack units with a wide range of 
attack strengths to build up. 
War in Iraq. At the beginning of the war in 2003, the power-law exponent was quite low 
and was essentially the same value as conventional wars. This is consistent with the war 
being fought by a conventional Iraqi army against the Coalition forces. There is then a 
break in this value after a few months (i.e. the conventional war ended) and following this, 
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the power-law exponent gradually rose towards 2.5. This suggests that the insurgents have 
been increasingly favoring more temporary attack units, with an increasingly rapid 
fragmentation-coalescence process. This finding could be interpreted as being a result of 
increased success by the Coalition Forces in terms of forcing the insurgents to fragment. On 
the other hand, it also means that the Iraq War has now moved to a value ofα , and hence 
character, which is consistent with generic non-G7 terrorism and it may therefore be hard to 
make further progress against them. 
  
 Finally we comment in more detail on the generality of the model. As noted by 
D'Hulst and Rodgers (see preprint cond-mat/9908481 at xxx.lanl.gov) the power-law 
exponent of 2.5 in this model seems to survive under a range of different generalizations. In 
particular, if the number of attack units which can coalesce at a given timestep is any 
number m, as opposed to simply m=2 as in the present version, the power-law exponent 
remains unchanged at exactly 2.5. D'Hulst and Rodgers suggest that allowing for a variable 
m, or a different process of fragmentation -- such as allowing some agents to remain 
connected after a fragmentation process -- will also preserve the value of the power-law 
exponent around 2.5. We have investigated such robustness further, with the help of Ben 
Burnett and Alex Dixon at University of Oxford, Department of Physics. Their findings, 
which are both analytic and numerical, confirm this general result of the robustness of the 
value 2.5. Indeed, we have even extended the model to account for several co-existing 
insurgent groups, and also for having one particular insurgent group have a 'home 
advantage' in clashes. A power-law still emerges, and it still seems to have an exponent α  
in the range 1.5 to 3.5. Hence one could say that despite the inherent uncertainty concerning 
the precise microscopic rules which describe a particular conflict, the value of the 2.5 for 
the power-law exponent will represent a good a priori expected value. Even though the 
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form of the high-s cutoff may depend on the details of the particular conflict, we can 
conclude that the presence of a power-law with an exponent α  of roughly 2.5 over a 
reasonably wide of range of s values is indicative of something generic in the mechanics of 
the conflict. In particular, it suggests that the way in which militarily inferior insurgent 
armies mount attacks against incumbent forces, is generic. This in turn suggests that any 
group of humans would end up waging war in the same way, if they were to be found 
fighting in such an asymmetric situation and without any dominant central coordination. 
 In light of the above discussion and findings, we are confident that the value of 2.5 
which is seen to be the current value in Iraq and Colombia, and is also very similar to other 
modern wars such as Afghanistan, is indeed a meaningful and significant value, and that the 
underlying common mechanism is indeed one of coalescence and fragmentation by the 
insurgent army.
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PART 2: Data and methods
Data: For Colombia, we are able to work with the very broad measure of all conflict-
related killings plus injuries taken from the CERAC Colombia Conflict Database (CCCD).  
The CCCD builds on primary source compilations of violent events by Colombian human 
rights NGO’s and from local and national press reports.  We distil from this foundation all 
the clear conflict events, i.e., those that have a military effect and reflect the actions of a 
group participating in the armed conflict.  For each event we record the participating 
groups, the type of event (massacre, bombing, clash, etc.), the location, the methods used 
and the number of killings and injuries of people in various categories (guerrillas, civilians, 
etc.).  This data set covers the years 1988-2004 and includes 20,227 events.  More 
information is available at http://www.cerac.org.co/ .  Since the materials found on this 
website give very detailed descriptions of CCCD, we will not reproduce such details here. 
 For Iraq we work with the CERAC Integrated Iraq Dataset (CIID).  The CIID builds 
on the event description from three datasets that monitor violence in Iraq: Iraq Body Count 
(http://www.iraqbodycount.net/), iCasualties (http://iCasualties.org/oif/) and ITERATE 
(http://www.cba.ua.edu/~wenders/).  All three sources contain event data on the Iraq war 
from its beginning on March 20, 2003.  The first two are continually updated whereas 
ITERATE is updated on an annual basis so at present only extends through the end of 2004.  
As we discuss below, ITERATE has a very small impact on CIID so the fact that it stops 
early does not affect the work of this paper.   
 The Iraq Body Count Project (IBC) monitors the reporting of more than 30 
respected online news sources, recording only events covered by at least two of them.  For 
each event IBC logs the date, time, location, target, weapon, estimates of the minimum and 
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maximum number of civilian deaths and the sources of the information.vii  IBC attaches the 
most confidence to their figures on the minimum number of killings in each event so the 
figures in the paper are based on these minimum numbers.  However, figure S8 (below) 
shows that Figure 1 changes very little if we substitute the maximum number of killings for 
the minimum number of killings.  The concept of civilian is broad, including, for example, 
policemen.  The list of events, posted online, covers the full range of war activity, including 
suicide bombings, roadside bombings, US air strikes, car bombs, artillery strikes and 
individual assassinations.   
 The IBC data has two principle drawbacks which need to be addressed in order for 
the reader to have confidence in our results.  First, some lines in the IBC spreadsheet 
contain entries that are not proper events.  The most important entries of this form are based 
on reports from morgues around Iraq.  For example, entry x355a lists 26 deaths between 
May 1, 2003 and May 31, 2003 described as “Violent deaths recorded at the provincial 
morgue of Karbala”.  The following hypothetical calculation illustrates how IBC handles 
these entries.  The Karbala morgue actually reports a higher figure, say 39 violent deaths 
for May of 2003.  However, IBC already has two events in Karbala for May of 2003, a car 
bomb killing 4 and a suicide bombing killing 5.  It is likely that these 9 deaths are included 
among the 39 violent deaths recorded by the Karbala morgue so IBC subtracts them off, 
leaving 30.  In addition, the murder rate in Karbala before the war was 4 per months so we 
might expect that 4 out of the remaining violent deaths would have happened even without 
the war.  IBC subtracts off these 4 leaving the figure of 26 which is the one they enter into 
the database.  This procedure is reasonable on its own terms, however deeply problematic 
for our purposes in this paper for two reasons.  First, most of the deaths in entries of this 
                                                 
vii IBC also records injuries but does not post this information on its open website. 
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form are likely to have occurred as single homicides since larger conflict events would be 
likely to have their own entry.  Clearly we would not wish to treat 26 individual homicides 
as one event in which 26 people were killed.  Second, most of the killings in events of this 
form are more tied to crime than to the conflict directly and we prefer to focus on a narrow 
definition of conflict killing.  For these reasons we delete from the IBC database entries of 
this nature.  We provide a list of events we deleted from IBC in Part 4 of the Supporting 
Online Material. 
 The second drawback of IBC is that it measures only civilian deaths, albeit with a 
wide concept of civilian.  Therefore, to get of fuller picture of the conflict we have added in 
events from iCasualties in which coalition military personnel and contractors are killed in 
conflict events (but not in accidents).  This is a highly reliable source as the military 
services keep solid records on the fate of their own personnel.  Finally, as a check for 
coverage of IBC and iCausualties we also integrated events from ITERATE, which is a 
global terrorism database that records terrorism events of international significance.   
 This integration required careful matching of events between the three sources to 
avoid double counting.  The following Venn diagrams give the results of this matching 
work, with event counts and numbers of killings accounted for by these events in 
parentheses below.  They show that most of the deaths in CIID come from IBC alone but 
that iCasualties does make a significant contribution.  The overlap between IBC and 
iCasualties is small, since they are measuring different things.  However, there is some 
overlap because sometimes both military personnel and civilians are killed in a single 
incident.  The impact of adding ITERATE into CIID is negligible, indicating that IBC and 
iCasualties give very full coverage of the Iraq war. 
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Figure S2:  Venn diagrams showing the sources behind the CIID database for 
03/20/03 – 10/23/05 and 5/1/03 – 10/23/05.  Overlaps indicate that the same event is 
reported in multiple sources.  The diagram gives the number of events with various 
degrees of overlap and (in parentheses) the minimum estimate of the number of 
killings accounted for by these events. 
 The Iraq war breaks naturally into two phases.  In the first phase, roughly from 
March 20, 2003 to April 30, 2003 the conflict had the character of a conventional war, 
marked by heavy aerial bombardments and a big push across Iraq by coalition land forces.  
From May 1, 2003 the war took on an “irregular” or “insurgent” character.  Accordingly, in 
figure 1 we used just the 3,333 events from May 1, 2003 until October 23, 2005 to ensure 
maximum comparability to the Colombian data.  However, figure S3 (below) shows that 
we get similar results if we use the combined data from both phases.  Figure 2, showing the 
evolution of both conflicts, uses all the Iraq data beginning from March 20, 2003 to 
October 23, 2005.  
 We note that the largest level of killings in events shown in Figure 1, according to 
the CIID database, occurred in Baghdad in 8/31/05 (965 killed) and in Fallujah where there 
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were two multi-day sieges: the first between 11/8/04 - 11/30/04 (581 killed) and the second 
between 4/5/04 and 4/30/04 (572 killed) which we have necessarily had to treat as single 
events. It turns out that even if we choose to exclude these three events, there is only a 
small impact on the parameter estimation in Figure 1, raising  from 7 to 8 and minx α  from 
2.31 to 2.42. Hence we are confident that our results are not distorted by the method chosen 
to characterize these particular large events. We also note that the Colombia curve is less 
noisy at high x  because that war has more events in this region. 
 The CERAC Integrated Afghanistan Database (CIAD) is constructed very similarly 
to CIID.  Two of the basic sources, iCasualties and ITERATE, are the same as in CIID, and 
provide 126 and 29 events respectively to CIAD.  The only difference is that IBC is 
replaced by data on Afghanistan provided by Marc Herold 
(http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/).  This project provided the original model for IBC 
and so has a very similar nature.  Herold monitors a large number of English language 
sources on the conflict in Afghanistan and provides a list of events with minimum and 
maximum killings on his web site.  (Figure S9 shows that our results are robust to whether 
we use minimum killings or maximum killings.)  The data comes in two separate files, the 
Afghanistan Daily Count database (ADC) with 763 events and the Day by Day Chronicle 
(DBDC) with 608 events.  ADC covers killings of Afghan civilians attributed to coalition 
forces during the period October 7, 2001 to June 3, 2003.  DBDC covers May 31, 2003 to 
July 31, 2004 and covers both civilian and military casualties, although this expansion has 
only a small impact on CIAD which already integrates information from iCasualties.  CIAD 
holds a total of 1430 registries between October 7, 2001 and July 31, 2004. 
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 Figure S3:  Venn diagrams showing the sources used to build the CIAD database for 
10/07/03 – 07/31/04.  Overlaps indicate that the same event is reported in two sources.  
The diagram gives the number of events and (in parentheses) the minimum estimate 
of the number of killings accounted for by these events. 
  
Methods:viii Let  be a random variable that follows a discrete power law for values 
greater or equal to . The probability that  takes a specific value  conditional 
on , denoted by , is: 
X
minx X k
minxX ≥ ( )⋅p
( ) ( )min, x
kkXp αζ
α−
==  for all  (0.30) minxk ≥
                                                 
viii We are grateful to an anonymous referee for having suggested improvements to the estimation methods 
that resulted in more accurate point estimates and stronger statistical evidence to support our results.  
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where  is the incomplete Riemann zeta function.( ) ∑∞
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 draws from this distribution which we call . Conditional on a fixed value 
of , which we call , the maximum likelihood estimator of the 
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To select the  parameter we use a grid search, which is based on the following 
procedure:   
minx
1. Create a list of K  feasible values for , denoted .  For 
each , , associate all the values of  that are greater than or equal to ;
minx Kxxx
K === min2min1min ,...,2,1
kxmin Kk ,...,1= X kxmin ix
2. Compute the maximum likelihood estimator for the α  parameter according to equation 
(0.31) for each combination of  and ’s above , with kxmin X
kxmin Kk ,...,1= .  This process 
yields a total of K  estimates ofα ;  
3. For each combination of  and ’s above , withkxmin X
kxmin Kk ,...,1= , calculate the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit statistic, which gives the maximum distance 
between the estimated theoretical distribution and the empirical distribution. Note that for 
each subset the empirical and theoretical distributions start at ;  kxX min=
4. Select  as the value of  that minimizes the KS test statistic and the minx
kxmin α estimate as 
the α value associated with this .  minx
                                                 
ix For all three cases in this paper we used 50=K . 
 42
5. Compute confidence bands for the α  parameter estimate through bootstrapping, which 
proceeds as follows. Generate a new dataset where each point is a random draw from the 
empirical distribution of the (observed) data given . This draw contains a number of 
data points exactly equal to the number of points in the original estimated power law.  
Repeat this process to create 2500 such datasets. Keeping  fixed we then estimate the 
minx
minx
α  parameter for each dataset by maximum likelihood estimation as defined in equation 
(0.31) and thus we obtain the distribution of the 2500 “bootstrapped” alphas.  The limits of 
the 95% confidence interval are given by the percentiles 2.5 and 97.5 of this distribution, 
respectively.  
 An alternative method for calculating confidence intervals on our α estimates uses 
the well-known property of asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimators.  
We prefer the bootstrap approach because it can display the stochastic properties of the 
maximum likelihood estimator well, even in small samples when there can be significant 
departures from normality.  We find no difference in the two approaches for our large 
Colombia dataset but the two approaches do differ for Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 Next we test the null hypothesis that the data follows the power-law estimated 
according to the above procedure.  First, we randomly draw 2000 samples, each generated 
from the theoretical power-law distribution given by the estimated α and and each with 
the same number of data points as in the observed data for .  We compute the KS 
statistic, comparing these samples to the theoretical distribution to obtain the distribution of 
the KS test statistic, conditional on the true data generation process being a power law with 
the estimated 
minx
minxx ≥
α and .  From this we calculate the probability that a power law with this 
estimated 
minx
α and  would generate a KS statistic bigger than the one we found in Step 4 minx
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of the above procedure on the real data.  For all three conflicts, these p values always come 
out far above any standard critical level. 
 To further test the reliability of our result, we use the same Monte Carlo procedure 
just described above to compare our data against the lognormal distribution. This is a 
natural comparator, as the lognormal shares some features of the power law distribution: 
they both exhibit fat tails; they are both defined only for positive values; and most 
importantly, the lognormal distribution could possibly resemble a straight line for some 
ranges of 1X . Again, we use the KS goodness-of-fit statistic to perform a test of rejection 
of the null of lognormality; in this case the test is calculated over all casualty levels, above 
and below , to see whether the whole sample follows a lognormal distribution. Results 
of these tests with the associated p-values are presented in Table T2 and suggest that we 
cannot reject with any reasonable degree of confidence the hypothesis that our data does 
not follow a lognormal distribution. In other words we can be confident that the data 
follows a power-law distribution, and does not follow a lognormal one. 
minx
For Figure 2, we calculated theα ’s for a sequence of sliding time windows for both 
Iraq and Colombia.  This work follows the time evolution of the power-law coefficient α  
through monthly estimation, using fixed-width time windows within each conflict to 
determine the sample-defined path of the estimatedα .  For Colombia each window was 
800 days long, and we slid it forward one month at a time.  For Iraq we used 400 day time-
windows which we also slid forward one month at a time.  Events in the Colombia conflict 
are roughly half as frequent as in Iraq, so we took advantage of the long run of Colombia 
data and built longer time-windows for Colombia than we did for Iraq.  Figure 2 also 
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displays symmetric confidence bands at 95%.x As a further check, we then repeated the 
calculation of α  for several different sizes of the time-windows and for the overlap interval 
which slides it forward in time. None of these modifications affected our main results or 
conclusions. Figure S6 show results with a 2,500 day time-window sliding every 60 months 
for Colombia, and a 365 day time-window displaced every 8 months for Iraq. Figure S7 
shows a moving time window of two years displaced every year for Colombia, and a 250 
day interval displaced every 150 days for Iraq. As can be seen, our results are essentially 
unchanged by these variations.  Furthermore, our results (whose details are available from 
the authors upon request) are statistically robust to the exclusion of high leverage points 
and extreme value observations. 
It is instructive to compare our discrete maximum likelihood (DML) estimator to 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and continuous maximum likelihood (CML) estimators (see 
Ref. [1] for a discussion regarding the different types of estimators).  Table T1 shows the 
results of numerical Monte Carlo simulations using the Mean Squared Error (MSE) for 
different sample sizes and varying  for a theoretical power-law distribution with a fixed minx
5.2=α .xi  An estimator is better than other if it has a lower MSE.  The DML estimator is 
the best one of the ones here compared.xii  
                                                 
x For these confidence intervals, we used the asymptotic normality of the ML estimator rather than 
bootstrapping.  The latter approach makes extreme computational demands, given the number of confidence 
intervals to compute. 
xi Simulations were performed with random samples of 100, 500, 1,000 and 5,000 and with 4,000 replications. 
xii The MSE represents the expected squared distance of the estimator from the population value; i.e., as the 
MSE is the sum of the squared bias and the variance of the estimator it is a weighted summary of the bias and 
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Mean Squared Error (MSE) 
Estimator Obs  1min =x 2min =x 5min =x 10min =x  50min =x
DML 100 0.0320 0.0255 0.0240 0.0238 0.0236
DML 500 0.0057 0.0047 0.0045 0.0045 0.0044
DML 1000 0.0028 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022
DML 5000 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004
   
CML 100 5.1161 0.7871 0.1230 0.0513 0.0263
CML 500 4.0614 0.6242 0.0764 0.0214 0.0054
CML 1000 3.9700 0.6083 0.0715 0.0181 0.0030
CML 5000 3.8808 0.5927 0.0670 0.0152 0.0011
   
OLS 100 0.4125 0.3595 0.3349 0.3271 0.2915
OLS 500 0.3206 0.2920 0.2770 0.2635 0.1310
OLS 1000 0.2986 0.2775 0.2609 0.2345 0.0681
OLS 5000 0.2576 0.2416 0.1944 0.1213 0.0183
BIAS 
Estimator Obs 1min =x  2min =x  5min =x  10min =x  50min =x  
DML 100 0.0216 0.0160 0.0145 0.0144 0.0156
DML 500 0.0039 0.0030 0.0027 0.0028 0.0040
DML 1000 0.0027 0.0022 0.0020 0.0020 0.0033
DML 5000 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0020
   
CML 100 2.1124 0.8147 0.2797 0.1384 0.0390
CML 500 1.9897 0.7761 0.2608 0.1237 0.0270
CML 1000 1.9797 0.7728 0.2594 0.1227 0.0263
CML 5000 1.9674 0.7684 0.2572 0.1209 0.0248
   
OLS 100 -0.5182 -0.4524 -0.4189 -0.4094 -0.3885
OLS 500 -0.4556 -0.4084 -0.3846 -0.3734 -0.2722
OLS 1000 -0.4299 -0.3916 -0.3702 -0.3530 -0.1838
OLS 5000 -0.3864 -0.3623 -0.3283 -0.2649 -0.0304
 
Table T1 Mean Square Error and Bias of the three feasible estimators for the 
estimation of the α power-law parameter for varying levels of values and 
sample sizes in Monte Carlo simulations with 4,000 replications. 
minx
                                                                                                                                                    
its efficiency, see Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2003, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 2 ed., 
South-Western Publisher of Thomson Learning. 
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Furthermore, Table T1 also shows the bias of each one of the possible estimators to 
use.  We find that the DML estimator has the lowest (upward) bias, that this bias falls 
rapidly with larger sample sizes and does not depend on the  value. On the other hand, 
the CML estimator has the largest (upward) bias of all, although for high  values this 
bias becomes rather small. The bias of the CML estimator does not fall as the sample size 
grows. Finally, we find that the OLS estimator has a (downward) bias which does not 
depends on the sample size or the values.  Figure S4 shows the distributions of the 
three estimators for a Monte Carlo simulation with a sample size of 500 and an . 
minx
minx
minx
5min =x
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Figure S4:  Simulated Monte Carlo distributions of the estimators of the α  power-law 
parameter for the Discrete Maximum Likelihood (DML), Continuous Maximum 
Likelihood (CML) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators, with a sample size 
of 500 and an .   The DML estimator shows the lowest Mean Squared Error 
(MSE) and Bias. 
5min =x
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PART 3: Tables and figures confirming the reliability of our results 
 
Estimates of power-law coefficients for the entire time-series 
 Country α  α  Lower 
Confidence 
Band 
α Upper 
Confidence 
Band 
minx  Significance 
of KS test 
for Power 
Law dist. 
Significance 
of KS test for 
Lognormal 
dist. 
K Colombia 2.9622 2.8847 3.0465 5 0.4860 <0.001 
I Colombia 2.7557 2.6345 2.8863 6 0.7780 <0.001 
KI Colombia 2.7896 2.7138 2.8722 7 0.5550 <0.001 
Kmin Iraq 2.3135 2.1765 2.4766 7 0.9970 <0.001 
Kmax Iraq 2.1612 2.1025 2.2313 3 0.4280 <0.001 
Kmin Afghanist
an 
2.4462 2.2117     2.8053 13 0.9050 <0.001 
Kmax Afghanist
an 
2.1629 2.0266     2.3387 10 0.5410 0.0448 
Table T2 Here we use a variety of measures of the impact of violent events to 
show that our results vary little depending on the choice of violence variables.  For 
Colombia we try killings (K), injuries (I) and, as in the paper, killings plus K and I.  
For Iraq and Afghanistan we use minimum killings, Kmin , as in the paper, and also 
maximum killings, Kmax.  Our α  parameter estimate is the maximum likelihood 
estimator for a discrete power law. For further discussion, see PART 2 of this 
Supporting Online Material. 
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Figure S5 This is the same as Figure 1 but with the whole Iraq war beginning 
20/03/03 rather than 01/05/03.  The results are very similar but Iraq now has a 
lower  (4) and a slightly lower alpha (2.12 vs. 2.31).   minx
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Figure S6 This gives the variation through time of the power-law coefficient α  for 
each war, using much longer time-windows than those used in Figure 2 of the 
paper.  For Colombia we use three 2,500 day intervals displaced by 60 months.  
For Iraq there are three 365 day intervals displaced every 8 months.  Despite this 
change in size of the windows and how they slide across time, both curves do 
seem to be heading toward 2.5 as in Figure 2 of the paper. For further discussion, 
see PART 2 of this Supporting Online Material. 
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Figure S7 This gives the variation through time of the power-law coefficient α  for 
two-year intervals displaced every year for Colombia and 250 day intervals 
displaced every 6 months for Iraq.  Again, they both seem to be moving toward 2.5, 
as in Figure 2 of the paper. For further discussion, see PART 2 of this Supporting 
Online Material. 
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Figure S8   Log-Log plots of cumulative distributions   describing events 
greater than 
)( xXP ≥
x  for the minimum possible value and maximum possible value of 
each event in the Iraq dataset.  The results are very much the same across the two 
measures. For further discussion, see PART 2 of this Supporting Online Material. 
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Figure S9   Log-Log plots of cumulative distributions   describing events 
greater than 
)( xXP ≥
x  for the minimum possible value and maximum possible value of 
each event in the Afghanistan dataset.  The main features of the results, such as 
the slopes, are similar for the two measures. Most importantly, as noted in Table 
T2, we find that (a) we cannot reject a power-law in either case, and (b) we can 
reject lognormality in both cases. For further discussions, see PART 2 of this 
Supporting Online Material. 
 
Finally we comment on an important advantage of focusing on the value of α  in 
order to characterize wars, as we have done in this paper. This advantage concerns possible 
over- or under-reporting of war casualties. In particular, it can be shown that α  is 
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insensitive to systematic over-reporting or under-reporting of casualties. This is because 
any systematic multiplication of the raw numbers by some constant factor has no effect on 
the α  value (i.e. slope) which emerges from the log-log plot for a power-law. Such 
systematic multiplication just rescales the intercept, leaving the slope unchanged. 
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PART 4: List of IBC events deleted in forming CIID 
Table T3 Detail of events excluded from IBC by reason of exclusion 
Reason 1:    
Morgue reports aggregate many killings over extended period:  many may be single homicides, 
possibly criminal rather than conflict 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
4/14/03 Baghdad 0 41
5/1/03 Unknown 26 26
5/1/03 Unknown 49 49
5/1/03 Unknown 15 16
5/1/03 Unknown 275 291
6/1/03 Karbala 27 27
6/1/03 Kirkuk 34 35
6/1/03 Tikrit 23 22
6/1/03 Baghdad 334 349
7/1/03 Karbala 15 16
7/1/03 Kirkuk 50 51
7/1/03 Tikrit 5 5
7/1/03 Baghdad 438 467
8/1/03 Karbala 25 25
8/1/03 Kirkuk 35 36
8/1/03 Tikrit 2 1
8/1/03 Baghdad 470 492
9/1/03 Baghdad 362 367
9/1/03 Karbala 12 14
9/1/03 Kirkuk 26 28
9/1/03 Tikrit 12 13
10/1/03 Karbala 10 2
10/1/03 Kirkuk 21 21
10/1/03 Tikrit 8 10
10/1/03 Baghdad 267 272
11/1/03 Unknown 26 33
11/1/03 Baghdad 256 267
12/1/03 Karbala 28 28
12/1/03 Kirkuk 20 21
12/1/03 Tikrit 13 13
12/1/03 Baghdad 287 296
1/1/04 Karbala 94 94
1/1/04 Kirkuk 12 12
1/1/04 Tikrit 6 8
1/1/04 Baghdad 268 277
2/1/04 Karbala 18 18
2/1/04 Baghdad 210 220
3/1/04 Karbala 217 221
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Reason 1:    
Morgue reports aggregate many killings over extended period:  many may be single homicides, 
possibly criminal rather than conflict 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
3/1/04 Kirkuk 14 14
3/1/04 Tikrit 9 11
3/1/04 Baghdad 317 334
4/1/04 Baghdad 232 236
4/1/04 Karbala 50 52
4/1/04 Kirkuk 13 13
4/1/04 Tikrit 9 10
5/1/04 Baghdad 295 341
6/1/04 Baghdad 375 418
7/1/04 Baghdad 364 413
8/1/04 Unknown 283 323
9/1/04 Unknown 310 353
10/1/04 Baghdad 394 435
11/1/04 Unknown 308 349
12/1/04 Baghdad 376 432
1/1/05 Baghdad 355 402
2/1/05 Baghdad 351 389
3/1/05 Baghdad 185 204
Subtotal   8236 8913
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 Reason 2:    
Police reports aggregate many killings over extended period: many may be single homicides, 
possibly criminal rather than conflict 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
5/1/03 Baghdad 16 16
6/1/03 Baghdad 18 19
7/1/03 Baghdad 20 21
8/1/03 Baghdad 25 26
9/1/03 Baghdad 17 18
10/1/03 Baghdad 15 16
11/1/03 Baghdad 14 15
12/1/03 Baghdad 10 10
Subtotal   135 141
 
Reason 3:    
Accidents 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
3/23/04 Balad 1 1
Subtotal   1 1
 
Reason 4:    
Events before May 1st, 2003 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
1/1/03 Qurnah 1 1
1/6/03 Amarah 2 2
2/10/03 Basra 2 2
3/2/03 Basra 6 6
3/5/03 Anbar 3 3
3/15/03 Unknown 1 1
3/20/03 Zubair 4 60
3/20/03 Baghdad 0 24
3/20/03 Baghdad 567 978
3/20/03 Nassiriya 633 633
3/20/03 Nassiriya 226 240
3/20/03 Unknown 30 30
3/20/03 Baghdad 200 200
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Reason 4:    
Events before May 1st, 2003 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
3/20/03 Baghdad 1473 2000
3/20/03 Najaf 224 358
3/20/03 Basra 142 200
3/20/03 
Najaf, Karba, Mosul, Samawa, Madain, Diwaniyah, Kut, 
Tikrit 484 445
3/20/03 Baghdad 22 22
3/20/03 Rutba 1 1
3/21/03 Baghdad 0 3
3/21/03 Umm Qasr 2 2
3/22/03 ImAnas 1 1
3/22/03 Mosul 4 4
3/22/03 Nassiriya 12 12
3/22/03 Basra 50 77
3/22/03 Tikrit 4 5
3/22/03 Kurdistan 57 100
3/23/03 Najaf 3 8
3/23/03 Rutbah 5 5
3/23/03 Babel 30 30
3/23/03 Basra 14 14
3/23/03 Karba 10 10
3/23/03 Nassiriya 10 10
3/24/03 Baghdad 5 5
3/24/03 Baghdad 5 5
3/25/03 Ash Shatra 2 2
3/25/03 Nassiriya 2 2
3/26/03 Rutbah 2 2
3/26/03 Baghdad 14 14
3/26/03 Baghdad 21 21
3/27/03 Missan 2 2
3/27/03 Mosul 2 50
3/27/03 Waset 2 2
3/27/03 Baghdad 7 7
3/27/03 Babel 26 26
3/27/03 Karba 11 11
3/27/03 Hillah 78 201
3/27/03 Najaf 26 26
3/28/03 Baghdad 34 62
3/28/03 Anbar 28 28
3/28/03 Babel 3 3
3/28/03 Baghdad 6 6
3/28/03 Karba 6 6
3/28/03 Najaf 35 35
3/29/03 Unknown 1 1
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Reason 4:    
Events before May 1st, 2003 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
3/29/03 Janabiin 20 20
3/30/03 Baghdad 15 15
3/31/03 Baghdad 6 6
3/31/03 Mosul 21 21
3/31/03 Hillah 15 15
3/31/03 Hillah 24 24
3/31/03 Najaf and Karba 11 11
3/31/03 Baghdad 24 24
4/1/03 Baghdad 1 1
4/1/03 Shatra 1 1
4/1/03 Hillah 33 33
4/2/03 Baghdad 43 43
4/2/03 Baghdad 5 5
4/3/03 Baghdad 10 16
4/3/03 Baghdad 27 27
4/3/03 Basra 42 51
4/3/03 Karba 5 5
4/3/03 Najaf 0 40
4/4/03  17 17
4/4/03 najaf 7 7
4/4/03 Baghdad 6 6
4/5/03 Karba 1 1
4/5/03 Baghdad 22 22
4/5/03 Rashidiya 85 85
4/5/03 Basra 17 17
4/6/03 irbil 1 1
4/6/03 Baghdad 15 15
4/6/03 karbala 35 35
4/7/03 Baghdad 2 2
4/7/03 Baghdad 9 14
4/7/03 Baghdad 11 11
4/7/03 Baghdad 4 4
4/7/03 Baghdad 3 3
4/8/03 Baghdad 1 1
4/8/03 Baghdad 2 2
4/8/03 Baghdad 35 35
4/8/03 Baghdad 13 13
4/9/03 Baghdad 2 2
4/9/03 Fathlia 4 4
4/9/03 Baghdad 5 21
4/9/03 Baghdad 21 26
4/10/03 Baghdad 30 30
4/10/03 Kirkuk 40 40
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Reason 4:    
Events before May 1st, 2003 
Start Date City 
Killings 
Min. 
Killings 
Max 
4/10/03 Nassiriya 3 3
4/10/03 Unknown 29 29
4/11/03 Baghdad 1 1
4/11/03 Mosul 2 28
4/11/03 Baghdad 3 3
4/11/03 Nassiriya 2 2
4/11/03 Baghdad 22 22
4/11/03 Baghdad 10 35
4/11/03 Baghdad 2 2
4/14/03 Baghdad 17 17
4/14/03 Kirkuk 52 52
4/15/03 Mosul 7 15
4/16/03 Mosul 3 4
4/18/03 Baghdad 1 1
4/19/03 Baghdad 3 3
4/19/03 Baghdad 3 3
4/20/03 Tikrit 0 12
4/20/03 Kirkuk 83 83
4/26/03 Zaafaraniya 12 12
4/26/03 Baghdad 2 2
4/28/03 Mosul 0 6
4/28/03 Fallujah 13 15
4/30/03 Fallujah 2 3
Subtotal   5504 7129
    
Grand total for all excluded events 13876 16184
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